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Summary findings
Numerous analysts have linked volunteering and  Volunteering may have important benefits in building
participation to positive economic and political  social capital and encouraging greater ownership of
outcomes. Schady uses the 1994 Peru Living Standards  development projects. For example, many public
Measurement  Survey to analyze volunteering patterns in  programs in rural Peru and elsewhere ask that the
rural Peru. He finds that volunteers in rural Peru have a  intended beneficiaries "participate"  as a means of
high opportunity cost of time. They are more educated  building trust and social capital, increasing the
and more likely to hold a job. Other household  sustainability of investments and helping self-target
characteristics, such as gender, marital status, length of  investments to the poor.
residence, and ethnicity, are also important predictors of  But Schady finds that encouraging participation by
the probability of volunteering.  potential beneficiaries is unlikely to be an effective form
Controlling for household characteristics, communities  of self-targeting, since people with a higher opportunity
differ widely in aggregate volunteer levels. These  cost of time volunteer more. Moreover, social programs
differences seem unrelated to differences in patterns of  that require participation may have difficulty reaching
government expenditure.  some vulnerable groups, such as women and the
illiterate.
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11.  Introduction
Numerous analysts have linked volunteering, working without pay, to positive economic
and political outcomes.  This possibility has been discussed at least since Tocqueville, but the
praises of volunteering and other forms of "participation" in community affairs have been sung
ever more loudly in the last decade. Under various guises, volunteering has been proposed as an
alternative to "inefficient" government activity (see Weisbrod, 1975, as well as much of the
recent literature on the "new federalism"); as a means of ensuring the sustainability of public
investments (Uphoff, 1992; Isham et. al., 1995); as an explicit attempt to self-target investments
to the poor, whose opportunity cost of time is assumed to be lower (for a general discussion, see
Besley and Kanbur, 1990; Ravallion, 1991; Besley and Coate, 1992);  and as part of a solution to
local collective action problems (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 138-41 et. passim; White and Runge, 1994).
Volunteering, it is argued, also nurtures civil society, builds trust, and may be a key ingredient in
a virtuous cycle of accountable govemment and high rates of economic growth (Putnam, 1993;
Fukuyama, 1995).
The theoretical economics literature on volunteering is extensive (including Tullock, 1971;
Arrow, 1974; Becker, 1974; Rose-Ackerman, 1982; Sugden, 1984; Andreoni, 1988). There are
also numerous empirical studies which seek to explain the determinants of volunteering in
European and North American countries (on Holland, van Jouke, 1993; on the United States,
Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987, and Freeman.,  1997; on Canada, Vaillancourt, 1994, and Day and
Devlin, 1996). In Less Developed Countries (LDCs), much of the empirical work has been
qualitative rather than quantitative, or based on much smaller sample sizes (for example, Ostrom;
White and Runge).
This paper seeks to identify the detenninants of volunteering in rural Peru: in a 1994
survey, alnost  10% of working-age adults in rural areas in Peru reported they did unpaid work
"for the benefit of the community" in the last week.  These men and women performed a
multitude of tasks: they constructed and repaired local infrastructure, helped with the upkeep of
land, cooked for community soup kitchens, cleaned, picked up trash, and volunteered as teachers,
doctors, or social workers. On average, voluanteers  donated almost seven hours of labor per week,
a large amount of time by any standard.
The basic conclusions of the paper are two. First, volunteers in rural Peru do not appear to
have a low opportunity cost of time. They are more educated, and are more likely to hold a job.
Other household characteristics, such as gender, marital status, length of residence, and ethnicity,
are all important predictors of the probability of volunteering. Second, controlling for household
characteristics, there are large differences across communities in rural Peru in aggregate volunteer
2levels. These differences do not seem to be related to differences in patterns of government
expenditure.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 gives a brief description of conditions
in rural Peru.  Section 3 outlines the extent to which traditional models of volunteering may be
relevant to rural Peru.  Section 4 describes the data set used for the analysis. Section 5 reports
the amount and types of voluntary activity, and provides estimates of the determinants of
volunteering.  Section 6 concludes by discussing some of the implications for public policies in
Peru.
2.  The setting
Peru is divided into three geographic regions--coast, sierra (or highlands), and selva (or
jungle). 2 About 30% of Peru's population of 23 million lives in rural areas, 14% of them on the
coast, 67% in the sierra, and 19% in the selva.
By virtually any measure of welfare, residents of rural areas appear to be worse off than
their urban counterparts. According to the 1994 LSMS, per capita expenditures in rural areas are
about half of what they are in urban areas, and the proportion of people who live below the
poverty line is about 25 percentile points higher (68.3%, compared to 42.0%). About two-thirds
of total expenditures made by rural households are devoted to food, compared to less than 50%
for urban households.
Health and nutrition indicators in rural areas are very poor: the 1991-92 Demographic and
Health Survey estimated that fully 53.4% of children under the age of five suffer from chronic
malnutrition (stunting), one of the worst rates in Latin America. The Total Fertility Rate in rural
areas is high, 6.2 children per woman, but infant mortality is also high, about 78 per 1000.
Indicators of educational attainment calculated from the LSMS show that about 12% of school-
aged children in rural areas are not enrolled in school, and more than 20% of those aged 15 or
older are illiterate. In every case, the comparable statistic for urban areas is about half that for
rural areas, except for adult illiteracy, which only affects 5% of adults in urban areas.
A large fraction of the population of the rural sierra and the rural selva speaks a native
Indian language as their mother tongue.  The languages spoken are principally Quechua and
Aymara in the sierra, and Shipibo and Campa in the selva. In keeping with the literature (for
example, MacIsaac and Patrinos, 1994), I define these people as indigenous. According to the
LSMS, 56.3% and 26.4% of households in the rural sierra and rural selva, respectively, are
2 This  section  is based  on my own  calculations  from  the LSMS,  Cuanto  (1995),  World  Bank  (1999),  and
the 1991-92  Peru Demographic  and  Health  Survey  (DHS).
3headed by an indigenous person, compared to only 7.4% in the rural coast, and 17.7% in urban
areas.
Rural Peru shares many features with other traditional, rural societies. In-migration into
communities is limited: more than 80% of adults in rural areas report that they were born in their
current place of residence. Almost 90% of households are headed by males.  Households tend to
be slightly larger than those in urban areas (5.3 members, compared to 5.1 members), and to have
more children under 16 (2.4, compared to 1.7). Labor market participation in rural areas is high:
almost 80% of the population above age 14 r eports that they have a job.  About three-quarters of
the employed work in agriculture. On the coast, the main crops grown are rice, maize, beans and
fruit; in the sierra, potatoes, other tubers, wheat, and quinua; and in the selva, rice, yuca, plantains
and fruit.  Much agriculture is small-scale, with peasant famnilies  working small plots with
traditional methods, limited use of fertilizer, and simple irrigation methods.  One partial exception
is the plantation agriculture for sugar, rice, cotton, and asparagus on the coast.
In general, the connection of rural households to many aspects of the "modern", formal
economy is still quite limited: for example, the LSMS indicates that less than 2% of households
in rural areas earn income from savings or stocks, and only about 5% have access to a pension or
social security.
3.  Understanding volunteering
There are at least two ways to think of the determinants of volunteering. In one
framework, volunteering is primarily decided by an individual's characteristics-for  example, his
wage and non-wage income. In an alternative framework, it is the characteristics of the
community which matter-for  example, the degree of "social capital", or the intensity of
government activity which could crowd out volunteer efforts.
The simplest, labor-market based model of volunteering assumes that volunteering is a
"consumption good". 3 People volunteer because they are altruistic (Arrow; Becker; Rose-
Ackerman), or because they derive a "warm glow" from doing good (Tullock; Andreoni).  Higher
wages have an ambiguous effect on volunteering: they increase income but also raise the
opportunity cost of time, making it more expensive to volunteer. By contrast, if volunteering is a
normal good, the expected effect of non-wage income on volunteering should be positive. 4 In
3In  a competing  theoretical  framework,  volunteering  is an investment  in  on-the-job  experience  and skills,
which  raises  the expected  future  wage  (Menchik;  and  Weisbrod;  Freeman).  This  model  does not have  much
applicability  in rural  Peru,  where  volunteering  generally  involves  physical  labor, and  volunteers  are
unlikely  to "build  up their resumes"  to command  a higher  wage.
4 Wealthier  people  may  also choose  to donate  cash  rather  than volunteer  time  to achieve  a certain  level  of
production  of "charity". The question  of the relationship  between  donations  of cash  and labor  has  received
4addition, there may be other household characteristics which affect the implicit cost of
volunteering.  For example, women in households with a large number of infants might be less
likely to volunteer than others because the opportunity cost of their time is higher (see the seminal
work by Gronau, 1973). Finally (and obviously), people with a larger taste for volunteering will
volunteer more.
The labor market approach assumes that volunteering is "charity".  However, if the
benefits of volunteering revert primarily to the members of a narrowly-defined "community", it
may be more appropriate to conceive of volunteer labor as an input into the production of a local
public good (for example, Sugden, 1984).5 Community characteristics may then be important:
Coleman (1988) argues that the degree of "closure" in social relations in a community is an
important determinant of the social capital a group has at its disposal (see also Putnam 1993).
Ostrom (1990) finds that communities have very different amounts of institutional capacity, and
that strong institutions allow communities to surmount the collective action problems which make
organization of volunteer labor difficult. Numerous analysts have also linked cooperation, social
capital, and the level of provision of public goods by both the public and private sectors to
income equality, ethnic homogeneity, and low geographical mobility (for example, van Dijk and
van Winden, 1997; Goldin and Katz,1998; Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1997; Easterly and
Levine, 1997).
Finally, if volunteering is a means of producing a local public good, the extent and nature
of government activity could be important. Consider two possibilities: on the one hand, it may be
that the government and volunteers provide the same services, so that government activity crowds
out the volunteer sector (for example, Steinberg, 1988). Alternatively, government programs may
require volunteering as a form of matching grant from the intended beneficiaries, and certain
government expenditures could have a positive effect on volunteering.
some  attention  in  the literature  on volunteering  in the United  States  (Menchik  and Weisbrod;  Freeman).
Arguably,  it is less  of a concern  in rural  Peru,  where  donations  of cash  are very  rare. The 1994  LSMS
shows  that less  than 1%  of households  in  rural areas  donated  money  to charities. A 1995  ex-post
beneficiary  assessment  of the Peruvian  Social  Fund  (FONCODES),  a government  agency  which  funds
small-scale  infrastructure  projects,  suggests  that  89%  of beneficiaries  contributed  free labor  for the
execution  of a project  in their community,  while  only 11%  and 8%  had contributed  cash  and materials,
respectively  (Apoyo,  1995,  no page  number). Had these  figures  been  broken  down  by rural and  urban
areas, the fraction  of beneficiaries  contributing  cash  in rural areas  would  almost  certainly  be much lower.
White  and Runge  (p. 26) report  similar  findings  for rural  Haiti.
5 When  the benefits  from  a local  public  good  are concentrated,  those who  stand  to benefit  the most could
simply  decide  to volunteer  and produce  it on their own  (Bilodeau  and Slivinski,  1996a  and 1996b). If
much  of the community  stands  to benefit,  however,  individuals  may  attempt  to act  cooperatively.  This
would  seem  to be an invitation  to free-riding,  but  there will be a large  premium  on finding  a workable
solution  to the free-riding  problem  when  the difference  in benefits  between  the cooperative  and non-
cooperative  strategies  is large  (Ostrom).
54.  The data set
The main data set used for this paper is the 1994 Peru LSMS. This is a nationally
representative houselhold  survey, funded by the World Bank and UNICEF, and executed by the
Peruvian think-tank Cuanto. All household interviews were conducted between June and August,
1994. The sample is stratified by region (Lima, and the urban and rural areas of the coast, sierra
and selva).  The weights across strata are not constant, and expansion factors have to be used to
make accurate calculations. Within each stratum, the probability of selection of every household
is constant, but standard errors have to be corrected for clustering.
Like similar surveys, the LSMS gathered a wealth of information on, amongst other things,
the demographic characteristics, ethnicity, expenditures, income, education, health status, and
migration patterns of household members. In addition, there are two questions on volunteering
included in the employment module of the survey. The first question, asked of all adults above
the age of 15, asks respondents if they performed any tasks "for the benefit of the community" in
the last seven days.  The follow-up question asks those who volunteered how many hours they
dedicated "to all these community activities".  The accompanying Surveyor's Manual specifies
that the activities in question are those "which were done to improve the village or neighborhood
in which the respondents live, or for the benefit of its inhabitants", and lists the construction of
bridges and paths, churchl-related  activities, and soup kitchens as examples. It also makes clear
that only activities which were done "without any payment, in cash or in kind" should be taken
into account (Cuanto, 1994, p. 50).
The answers to the first question about volunteering were recorded with the same codes
used throughout the employment module.  For example, if a given respondent answered that (s)he
had worked repairing the roof of the local health center, the activity would be given one of the
codes for "construction". 6 We therefore have a great deal of information about one aspect of the
activity performed-we  can distinguish whether "construction" involved woodwork, bricklaying,
stone masonry, painting-but  very little about another-we  cannot tell whether repairs were
made to the local school, healtlh  center, or community center.  This makes it impossible to
estimate the net benefits from the goods or services produced with volunteer labor. 7
6 When  respondents  reported  that  they  had voluLnteered  for more  than one  task,  the task  to which  they
devoted  the greatest  amount  of time  was recorded.
7 To see why this  might  complicate  interpretation  of the results,  suppose  that the poor volunteer  more  and
that  local public  goods  produced  with  volunteer  labor  systematically  favor  poor households.  In this  case,
high  rates  of volunteering  amongst  the poor could  be a sign of the low  opportunity  cost  of volunteering  or
of the high  benefits  they expect  to receive,  and  there  will be no way  of disentangling  the two effects. Is it
possible  to make  a set of reasonable  assumptions  which  would  eliminate  this  problem? Consider  two
assumptions,  either  one of which  would  suffice. First,  one could  assume  that people  contribute  labor  for
local public  goods  primarily  because  they derive  moral  satisfaction  from contributing,  rather  than because
of the economic  value  of the goods  in question. Such  an assumption  may not be unreasonable,  and is
6On the basis of the LSMS, I construct a vector of individual and household characteristics
which could have an effect on the supply of volunteer labor. These include the demographic
composition of the household, age, gender, marital status, education level, ethnicity, and whether
or not the respondent was born in his current place of residence. One shortcoming of these data is
that it is virtually impossible to disentangle the wage and non-wage components of income
because a very large fraction of individuals in the rural sample in the survey are farmers, often
working on their own plots of land. A second problem of the data relates to the absence of
community measures.  The community questionnaire in the 1994 LSMS was not consistently
applied in the same communities as the household questionnaire, while the number of households
sampled withinl  a given cluster (between 4 and 13) is arguably too small to construct survey-based
estimates of measures of ethnic and income dispersion within a cluster.
I use a measure of the expenditures made by the Peruvian Social Fund, FONCODES, in the
twelve months before the survey as a partial control for the effect of public expenditures on
volunteering.  FONCODES finances small-scale infrastructure projects throughout the country,
especially in rural areas.  Although there is no comprehensive, disaggregated data on public
expenditures in Peru, FONCODES is probably the largest single source of funding for the kinds
of projects which could affect volunteering in the rural areas of Peru. 8 FONCODES keeps
records of monthly expenditures at the district level. Districts are the smallest political unit in
Peru, and the sample of rural households drawn for the LSMS includes observations from 103 of
Peru's  1812 districts.
supported  by a growing  body  of experimental  research  (Palfrey  and Prisbey,  1997;  Kahneman  and  Knetsch,
1992). This  essentially  takes  us back  to the "charity"  framework.  Alternatively,  given  the wide variety  of
activities  which  fall under  the general  rubric  of volunteering  in  rural  Peru (see  Table  2 below),  one could
assume  that  differences  in direct  benefits  from  the local  public  goods  produced  with  volunteer  labor  wash
out: one household  with  many children  benefits  most  from  the construction  of an additional  classroom,
while another  household  with a plot of land  near  the river  benefits  most from  repairs  to an irrigation  ditch
but,  in the aggregate,  benefits  are roughly  constant  across  households.  In this case,  benefits  are an omitted
variable  from  the volunteering  equation,  but they are not systematically  correlated  with  household
characteristics  and should  therefore  not bias the estimated  coefficients.
r A World  Bank  study  on the programs  of the Ministry  of the Presidency,  the Ministry  charged  specifically
with poverty  alleviation  in Peru,  shows  that  FONCODES'  budget  was almost  15 times  the size  of that  of
COOPOP,  the only  other  program  in the Ministry  which  executed  comparable  small-scale  infrastructure
programs  in rural  areas  (World  Bank,  1996,  p. 22). Data  from  the Ministry  of Economy  and  Finance,
meanwhile,  suggest  that FONCODES'  budget  was  about eight  times  the size of the budget  of the Rural
Roads  program  of the Ministry  of Transportation,  and  ten times  the size  of the PRONAMACHS  program  of
the Ministry  of Agriculture  (Sierra  and O' Brien,  1994,  p. 13). Peru is an extremely  centralized  country,
and expenditures  by local governments  on rural  infrastructure  are generally  very  small  (World  Bank,
1995b,  pp. 25-37).
75.  Results
Who are the volunteers in rural Peru?  What do they do?  Table 1 compares the
demograplhic  and economic characteristics of volunteers and non-volunteers, as well as of the
households to whichi  they belong.  Table I shows that volunteers are no more likely to be poor;
are no less educated; and are actually significantly more likely to be employed than non-
volunteers.  VoluLnteers  therefore do not appear to have a lower opportunity cost of time than non-
volunteers. 9 Table  I also points to other significant differences between volunteers and non-
volunteers: Volunteers are more likely to be male, married, and indigenous. Volunteering does
not seem to be a substitute for or a complement of either cash donations to charity or the
likelihood of making a cash transfer to a relative or friend.
Table 2 breaks down volunteer labor by occupational category, and by gender.  The values
in each cell correspond to the fraction of male and female volunteers who reported they worked
on a particular task, so that each column adds to 100%.1' Two points are worth noting.  First,
although volunteer labor was used for a multitude of tasks, "construction" and "farming" jointly
account for almost two thirds of volunteer activity. The data does not allow for a precise
breakdown, but volunteer labor for "construction" probably involves activities like construction
and repair of schools, health posts, rural roads, and water and sanitation systems, while "farming"
probably involves activities like construction and repair of irrigation ditches, soil conservation,
and reforestation. Second, there are differences in the kind of volunteer activity provided by men
and women in some categories but, surprisingly, not in others. For example, given that they
volunteered, females are just as likely to work on construction as males.
I turn next to regression analysis to estimate a reduced-form volunteer equation.  The
dependent variable is binary, taking on the value of one if respondents report having volunteered,
and zero otherwise, and all specifications are estimated by probit. The regression coefficients can
therefore be interpreted as changes in the probability of volunteering associated with a one-unit
change in the independent variable in question.  The sample size is limited to those aged 16 and
over.  All reported standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering.
In the first specification, volunteering is regressed on a vector of individual and household
characteristics, including variables for age and age squared, years of completed schooling,
household size, and dummy variables for gender (male=l; female=O),  marital status (married=l;
unmarried=O),  wlhetlier  the respondent is a household head (yes=1; no-O), whether or not (s)he
was born in the current place of resident (yes=l;  no=O),  three dummy variables for ethnicity
9  Unless  labor  markets  work  perfectly,  one might  expect  workers  to have a higher  opportunity  cost  of time
than  those who  stay at home.
8corresponding to respondents whose mother tongue is Quechua, Aymara, and one of the native
languages spoken in the selva, as well as dummy variables for the sierra and the selva. The
second specification supplements these with district-level measures of population, mean income,
and expenditures made by FONCODES in the twelve months prior to the survey."  The third
specification is a fixed-effects specification which includes dummy variables for every cluster in
the survey. Note that the sample sizes in this cluster fixed-effects specification are smaller
because all clusters in which no-one (or everyone) reports having volunteered have to be dropped.
Also, the regional dummies and the district-level  measures have to be excluded from the
regression to avoid perfect colinearity.
Table 3 confirms that individuals with more schooling are significantly more likely to
volunteer.  Every additional year of education increases the probability of volunteering by
between .004 and .007-equivalent  to between 6.0 and 5.1 percentile points of the predicted
probability of voluInteering  at the means of other variables.'2 Again, this does not seem to be
consistent with an explanation in which volunteering is primarily done by individuals with a low
opportunity cost of time.1 3
To further explore the relationship between opportunity cost of time and volunteering, I
graph the probabi  I  ity of volunteering as a function of the number of hours worked (for a similar
graph, see Freeman). A priori, one might expect to find evidence of substitution between work
time and the probability of volunteering: working long hours should be an indication of a high
opportunity cost of time-both  because people who work more are likely to have a high marginal
return to work, and because the value of leisure increases as more hours are spent on the job.  But
Figure I shows that the probability of volunteering generally increases with the number of hours
worked, at least for men.  Like the results in Tables I and 3, Figure 1 seems to confirm that, if
anything, individuals with a high opportunity cost of time volunteer more. 14 Figure 1, finally,
shows that men are much more likely to volunteer than women in rural Peru.
10  Because  the ratio of male  to female  volunteers  is approximately  three  to one,  however,  males  are actually
more  likely  to volunteer  in every  category  except  medical  services,  social  work,  and cooking.
"  This  is an imputed  measure  of income,  estimated  by combining  information  from  the 1993  census  with  a
1995  household  survey. For a discussion  of the general  methodology  see Hentschel  et. al. 2000. For its
application  in Peru  see INEI 1996  and Schady  2000b.
12 For example,  in the first  specification  the predicted  probability  of volunteering  for those with x years  of
schooling  is .0726315,  while  the predicted  probability  for those  with x + 1  years of schooling  is (.0726315
+ .0043496)  = .0769811.  The change  in  probability  as a fraction  of the predicted  probability  itself is
therefore  (.0043496  / .0726315)  = .05989  = 6.0%.
13 When  per capita  expenditures  are included  in  these  regressions  the coefficient  on per capita  expenditures
is indistinguishable  from zero  (z-statistics  are -0.54,  -0.36,  and  0.18),  while  the coefficient  on years  of
education  remains  essentially  unchanged.
14 Freeman  suggests  that motivation  is an omitted  variable  from the volunteering  equation  (as well as from
standard  earnings  or labor  supply  equations).  More  motivated  individuals  work  more  in the job market  and
volunteer  more.
9What about the effect of other individual and household characteristics? The coefficients
on age and age squared show that the probability of volunteering increases with age, albeit at a
decreasing rate, and decreases with household size.  One possible explanation for the negative
coefficient on household size might be that community tasks often require that each household
provide a fixed amount of labor-say,  one able-bodied worker-regardless  of household size.
The results in Table 3 also show that men, household heads, those who are married, and those
born in their current place of residence are all more likely to volunteer, as are native non-Spanish
speakers. Heads of household, married people, and long-term residents may all be more likely to
stay in the community in which they cuirently live and may therefore be more willing to invest in
the production of local public goods.  Higher volunteering rates among the Quechua, Aymara,
and other non-Spanish native speakers are probably an indication of cultural or sociological
differences: there is a great deal of anthropological work on pattems of cooperation and
reciprocity-volunteering,  broadly defined-in  indigenous communities in rural Peru, especially
in the sierra (see, for example, Alberti and Mayer, 1974; Matos Mar, 1976; Aramburui  and Ponce
Alegre, 1983; Mossbrucker, 1990).15  Note that all of these effects are remarkably consistent
across specifications, including the fixed-effects specification.
I turn next to geographic variations in volunteer activity, and to the possible relationship
between these differences and differences in government activity. Note, first, that volunteering is
much more widespread in the rural sierra and especially the rural selva than in the rural coast (the
differences become even larger when the variables measuring ethnicity are excluded from the
regression because of the high concentration of indigenous people in the sierra and the selva).
Second, the very large increase in the pseudo R-squared in specification (iii) suggests that there
are important differences in the level of volunteering across communities-differences  which
may well be related to underlying differences in social capital, institutions, and within-community
homogeneity.
Finally, the results in specification (ii) suggest there is no apparent effect of FONCODES
expenditures on the decision to volunteer. That is, FONCODES investments do not appear to
crowd volunteer efforts in or out.  Measurement error and simultaneity bias may both be sources
of conceni in the estimated impact of FONCODES investment.  Measurement error is common in
analytical work which combines data from household surveys and administrative sources.  This is
a peculiar form of measurement error, however, since it does not bias the coefficients on the mis-
measured variable(s) towards zero.  Rather, the estimated coefficients are unbiased but estimated
15  Higher  volunteering  among  the indigenous  may  also  be an indication  of discrimination  in the wage-
earning  market  (Macisaac  and Patrinos),  which  could lower  the opportunity  cost of volunteering  for
indigenous  people.
10imprecisely (see Deaton, 1997, pp. 100-01). Simultaneity bias may arise because FONCODES
encourages beneficiaries to participate in the execution of a project, and may favor areas in which
there is a large predisposition for volunteering. The causality would then run, at least in part,
from volunteer levels  to FONCODES expenditures, and including the level of FONCODES
expenditures as a regressor in the volunteer equation would produce biased and inconsistent
results.  The usual solution for this problem is instrumental  variables (IV).  I attempted two IV
specifications to address the possible endogeneity of FONCODES investments. FONCODES
makes al locations to districts on the basis of a formula which includes the population of the
district, the fraction rural, and a composite index which is a weighted average of eight variables-
the rate of chronic malnutrition, illiteracy, school-aged children not in school, overcrowded
housing, inadequate roofing, and the proportion of the population without access to water,
sewerage, and electricity. If district-level allocations are uncorrelated with the error term in the
volunteer equation, conditional on the log of mean per capita income and the log of population,
then the district-level allocation would be a valid instrument for FONCODES expenditures
(Paxson and Sclhady,  1999). Unfortunately, the 2SLS regression which uses allocations as an
instrument is quite sensitive to exactly how FONCODES expenditures are specified (in levels,
logs, or a per capita basis).  In a different approach, I use results reported by Schady (2000),
which show that FONCODES expenditures were affected, in part, by the voting record of a
province.  Specifically, after 1993, FONCODES funded a disproportionate number of projects in
provinces which had voted for Fujimori in the 1990 presidential election, but against Fujimori in
the 1993 referendum on the new constitution. If the change in the province-level vote is
uncorrelated with the error term in the volunteer equation, conditional on the log of mean per
capita income and the log of population, then the change in the vote would be a valid instrument
for FONCODES expenditures. Unfortunately, the first-stage regression shows that the change in
the vote is not a significant predictor of expenditures in the sub-sample of provinces in the rural
sample of the 1994 LSMS. Since neither instrument is fully satisfactory, it is not clear to what
extent the coefficient on FONCODES expenditures in specification (ii) is biased by endogeneity.
6.  Conclusion
This paper makes a contribution to the analysis of volunteering and other forms of unpaid
"participation" in community affairs.  To the best of the author's knowledge, there is no other
quantitative  analysis of the determinants of volunteering in an LDC. I show that volunteering is
widespread in rural Peru, and that there are large, significant differences in the probability of
volunteering. Volunteers in rural Peru have a high opportunity cost of time: they are better
educated, more likely to head a household, and more likely to be married.  Moreover, I find no
11evidence of any substitution of volunteer time and work time. Finally, there is no clear effect of
public expenditures on voluntary activity.
The analysis in this paper suggests a complementary line of research to the labor market
models of volunteering. The results show that gender, age, education, marital status, household
headship, long-term residency, and ethnicity consistently predict voluntary activity in rural Peru.
Many of these characteristics are arguably correlated with a higher degree of attachment to the
community.  For example, being married and heading a household may encourage "responsible"
behavior. They also foster links of interdependence  within the family-links  which may extend
to the community.
One could also think of volunteering in terms of the accumulation of prestige within a
community.  This line of reasoning would build on work which attempts to introduce social status
considerations into the economic analysis of decision-making in the labor market (for example,
Baumol, 1990; Fershttman  and Weiss, 1993). Volunteering may help confer or confirm social
status-status  whichl  males, married people or household heads may be more likely to seek and
attain.  More educated people could have a better sense of such intangible benefits from
volunteering, or be in a position to assume leading roles in the affairs of the community.
Whatever relationship exists between volunteering and social status, it is bound to be complex:
high-status individuals may volunteer to confirm their status, or they may be responding to social
expectations that they engage in volunteer work.
Many public programs, in rural Peru and elsewhere, ask that the intended beneficiaries
"participate".  Volunteering may have important benefits in terms of building trust and social
capital, and of increasing the sustainability  of investments. Participation is also proposed as a
way of self-targeting investments to the poor.  The results in this paper suggest two possible
concerns with this approach. First, if people with a higher opportunity cost of time volunteer
more, encouraginig  participation by potential beneficiaries is unlikely to be an effective form of
self-targeting. Moreover, social programs which require participation may not effectively reach
some particularly vulnerable groups, such ,as  women or the illiterate. Second, if volunteering
confirms status and vulnerable groups are less likely to volunteer, participatory social programs
may have the unintended consequence of reinforcing existing social hierarchies, unless they are
explicitly designed to encourage or require the participation of traditionally excluded groups.
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15Table 1: Characteristics of individuals  who volunteer
Volunteers  Other
Summary statistics
Number  or observations  336  3,324
Population  (adults)  384,659  3,817,178
% volunteering  9.15
Average  hours  volunteered  (volunteers)  6.72
Demographics
Mean  age (years)  39.65  37.46
# of years  o  f education  5.94  n.s.  5.81
% Males  76.31  47.34
% Married  58.01  42.76
Mean  number  of members  in  HH  5.59  **  6.00
Mean  number  of children  in HH (age  <16)  2.83  n.s.  2.68
Mean  number  of old  people  in HH (age  >59)  0.16  0.29
% Indigenous  59.05  39.63
% Born in  current  place  of residence  82.92  n.s.  80.58
Economic  characteristics
% people  in  poverty  62.12  n.s.  60.87
% giving  to charity  0.00  n.s.  1.40
% making  transfer  to "relative"  or "friend"  16.48  n.s.  17.53
% Employed  82.47  98.03
Notes: Estimated means, taking into account the clustered and weighted nature of the data.  Levels of
significance for an F-test for difference in the means for volunteers and non-volunteers are reported.  *
Difference is significant at the 10% level; ** difference is significant at the 5% level; *** difference is
significant at the 1% level; n.s.: difference is not significant.
16Table  2: Type of volunteer  work  provided,  by gender
Males  Females
Construction  39.30  n.s.  37.75
Farming  30.39  **  15.70
Teaching  .84  n.s.  1.72
Doctor.  IIISC.  dentist. veterinarian  .48  **  4.85
Social  Nvork  0  n.s.  2.53
Cooking  .48  12.97
Cleaning.  pickiing  up trash  6.60  n.s.  8.90
Other  21.92  n.s.  15.58
Total  100.00  100.00
Note: * Sig.nificant  at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level; n.s.: not
significanit.
17Table 3: Determinants of volunteering, various specifications
(i)  (ii)  (iii)
Age  .0073 (3.22)***  .0073 (3.28)***  .0097 (3.03)***
Age squared  (xI0)  -.0001 (3.50)***  -.0001 (3.47)***  -.0011  (3.04)***
Years of education  .0043  (2.11)**  .0051  (2.44)**  .0072 (2.49)**
Household size  -.0039  (1.84)*  -.0043 (2.12)**  -.0051 (1.62)
Male  .0404 (2.39)**  .0393 (2.38)**  .0514 (2.40)**
Married  .0195 (1.64)  .0179 (1.50)  .0292 (1.68)*
Household head  .0695 (3.73)***  .0651 (3.53)***  .0905 (3.86)**
Not born in current residence  -.0242 (2.01)**  -.0213 (1.77)*  -.0267 (1.60)
Quechua  .0502 (2.55)**  .0555 (2.93)***  .0600 (1.72)*
Aymara  .0819 (2.42)**  .0792 (2.18)**  .0190 (0.30)
Other indigenous  .1513 (4.35)***  .1687(4.50)***  .0375 (0.87)
Sierra  .0260 (1.24)  .0014 (0.70)  -
Selva  .0949 (2.87)***  .0813 (2.65)***  --
Log (population)  .0043  (0.40)
Mean  income  --  -.0002 (1.75)*
Foncodes exp. per cap  - .0000 (1.42)  --
Cluster Dummies  No  No  Yes
Observed probability of volunteering  0.099  0.099  0.141
Predicted probability of volunteering  0.073  0.071  0.086
Pseudo R-Squared  .127  .133  .226
Number of observations  2908  2908  2047
Notes:  Dependent  variable  is the probability  of volunteering.  Z-statistics  corrected  for heteroskedasticity
and clustering  are reported  in parentheses.
* Significant  at the  10% level;  ** significant  at the 5% level;  *** significant  at the  1% level.
18Figure 1: Hours worked and probability of volunteering
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Nkote:  Fan regrlessions  with  a quartic  kernel  and  bandwidth  of 20. Sample  limited  to adults above  age 16.
HAours  worked  includes  all hours worked  on the nnain  job as well as on any  secondary  jobs. Respondents
.vho  claii  med  to spend  more  than I  00 hours  per week  on the main  and  secondary  jobs were dropped  from
the sample,
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